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GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK*

Equitable Apportionment After
Vermejo: The Demise of
A Doctrine**
ABSTRACT
Historically,the Supreme Court has resolved interstatewater conflicts under the doctrine of equitable apportionment. The decisions
of the Court regardinga conflict between Colorado and New Mexico
over the waters of the Vermejo River, however, have established
burden of proof requirements that may eliminate equitable apportionment as a means of resolving interstate water conflicts. This
article discusses the historicaldevelopment of the doctrine and reviews the Vermejo decisions. Alternative means of resolving interstate water conflicts are discussed. Finally,given the inevitability of
litigation regardless of which means of resolving interstate conflicts
is selected, alternative litigation strategiesare considered.
Dividing The Waters
The Lord said to Moses, "Why do you cry to me? Tell the people
of Israel to go forward. Lift up your rod, and stretch out your hand
over the sea and divide it, that the people of Israel may go on dry
ground through the sea." . . . Then Moses stretched out his hand
over the sea; and the Lord drove the sea back by a strong east wind
all night, and made the sea dry land, and the waters were divided.'
The children of Israel were saved from the Pharaoh's advancing army
when the waters of the Red Sea were parted. Unfortunately, dividing the
waters has never again been as simple.
The Supreme Court, exercising authority falling somewhere between
that of the Lord and that of Moses, will divide the waters of an interstate
water resource under the doctrine of equitable apportionment. To prevail
in an equitable apportionment action, a state must demonstrate through
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1. Exodus 14: 15-16, 21 (King James).
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clear and convincing evidence that it is suffering real and substantial
injury or harm. In essence, had Moses asked the Supreme Court to divide
the Red Sea, he would have been forced to provide clear and convincing
evidence of the need for the division, of the intent of the Pharaoh's army
and of the harm that would have befallen his people had the division not
occurred. Mere knowledge of the army's pursuit would have been inadequate. The battle had to be imminent before the waters could be
divided.
This review addresses the doctrine of equitable apportionment in light
of the Vermejo decisions. 2 The development of the doctrine is discussed,
as are two recent equitable apportionment decisions that concerned the
Vermejo River in Colorado and New Mexico. Finally, given the adverse
impact of the Vermejo decisions on the use of equitable apportionment
as a mechanism for resolving interstate water conflicts, alternative mechanisms for resolving such conflicts (including alternative litigation strategies) are discussed.
Equitable Apportionment
Background
The Constitution, article 3, section 2, provides that "In all cases...
in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original

jurisdiction." In suits between states, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is
both original and exclusive.'
The Court has exercised its original jurisdiction several times to resolve
interstate water conflicts. 4 These decisions form the body of federal interstate common law generally know as the doctrine of equitable apportionment.5 It is this doctrine which may be applied by the Court to future

2. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) [hereinafter Vermejo !1, later proceeding, 463
U.S. 1024, later proceeding, 464 U.S, 927 (1983), dismissed, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) [hereinafter
Vermejo i1.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1984) provides that "[tlhe Supreme Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States." See generally Note, The
Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, II STAN. L. REV. 665, 681-83 (1959).
4. A discussion of the various roles the Supreme Court plays in fashioning an equitable appor-

tionment decree in a specific case can be found in 2 R.

CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs

328

(1967).
5. See 3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGTffs LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 66 (1977);
Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revised, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L.
REV. 381 (1985); F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 642 (3d ed. 1979). Equitable apportionment from a
Colorado perspective can be seen in Note, Colorado v. New Mexico 11: Judicial Restraint in the
Equitable Apportionment of Interstate Waters, 62 DEN. U. L. REV. 857 (1985) [hereinafter Fahmy
Note]. A New Mexico perspective can be found in Note, Is There a Future for Proposed Water
Users in Equitable Apportionment Suits?, 25 NAT. Res. J. 791 (1985) [hereinafter McCrossen Note],
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conflicts between states over shared water resources.6 To understand the
doctrine, therefore, it is necessary to understand the case law by which
it has been developed.
The case that established the doctrine of equitable apportionment of
interstate water resources was Kansas v. Colorado.7 In this case, Kansas
attempted to restrict Colorado's use of the Arkansas River. Kansas, basing
its claim on riparian water law, sought the full natural flow of the Arkansas
River. The Supreme Court, after acknowledging that economic interests
in Kansas might be harmed by Colorado's use of Arkansas River water,
ruled that Colorado was entitled to a share of those waters. The Court
considered Kansas water law (riparian) and Colorado water law (prior
appropriation) and concluded that, when state laws and policies were in
conflict, equity would control and the interests of the two states would
be balanced. Colorado prevailed, primarily because Kansas was unable
to prove to the Court that Kansas' interests would actually be harmed by
diversions in Colorado. 8
The second equitable apportionment decision, in Wyoming v. Colorado,9 resulted from an attempt by Wyoming to prevent diversions of
Laramie River water by Colorado. In part, the Colorado diversion was
to be used in the Laramie-Poudre Tunnel, a transmountain diversion
project. Wyoming based its claim on the seniority of Wyoming water
rights since both Colorado and Wyoming recognized the doctrine of prior
appropriation. Wyoming also argued that the trans-basin diversion should
not be allowed since there would be no return flows into the Laramie
River.
Both arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court. Trans-basin diversions would be allowed since such uses were allowed under state law.
The Court refused to apply a strict doctrine of prior appropriation, applying instead a limited priority of appropriation which recognized senior
water rights in both states. Once these rights were recognized, the Court
ruled that there was sufficient flow in the Laramie River for the LaramiePoudre Tunnel diversion. Colorado was to receive 39,750 acre-feet/year
(ac./ft./yr.) with the balance of the dependable flow of the Laramie River

6. Since each equitable apportionment action is based on a unique set of facts, the doctrine is
applied on a case-by-case basis.
7. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 332, 349; 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note
5, at 69; Tarlock, supra note 5, at 385; F. TRELEASE, supra note 7, at 642.
8. The ongoing conflict between Colorado and Kansas over the waters of the Arkansas River
basin is again before the Supreme Court. The present manifestation of this conflict is summarized
at note 23.
9. 259 U.S. 419, modified, 260 U.S. 1 (1922), vacated, 353 U.S. 953 (1957). See 2 R. CLARK,
supra note 4, at 331; 3 W. HUTcHINs, supra note 5, at 69, n. 15; Tarlock, supra note 5, at 385;
Trelease, supra note 5, at 646.
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(312,250 ac./ft./yr.) going to Wyoming. Presumably, shortages in lowwater years were to be borne by Wyoming. This was a "mass allocation"
of water to Colorado and Wyoming."0 The Court also imposed a duty on
each state to "exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated
to conserve the common supply" of water."
The first equitable apportionment action between two riparian states
resulted in the decision in Connecticut v. Massachusetts.' Connecticut
sought to enjoin Massachusetts from new diversions of the Connecticut
River for use in the Boston metropolitan area. The Court rejected Connecticut's claim because Connecticut was unable to show any "real or
substantial injury or damage" that would result from the proposed diversion."' The Court refused to apply the riparian rights doctrine. Other
factors, it seemed, "quite outweighed the common elements of riparian
law." " The Court did restate the "interstate common law" of equitable
apportionment:
The determination of the relative rights of contending States in respect
of the use of streams flowing through them does not depend upon
the same considerations and is not governed by the same rules of
law that are applied in such States for the solution of similar questions
As
of private right. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 ....
was shown in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 100, such disputes
are to be settled on the basis of equality of right. But this is not to
say that there must be an equal division of the waters of an interstate
stream among the States through which it flows. It means that the
principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the
"equal level or plane on which all the States stand, in point of power
and right, under our constitutional system" and that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other
relevant facts, this Court will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the use of such waters. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S.
419, 465, 470."
The next equitable apportionment action also involved two riparian
10. The decree was amended in 353 U.S. 953 (1957). Total Colorado diversions were ultimately
increased to 19,875 ac/ft/yr for out-of-basin uses and 29,500 ac/ft/yr for uses within the Laramie
River watershed. Id. at 953-54.
I1. 259 U.S. at 484,
12. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 348; Tarlock, supra note 5, at 393;
F.TRELASE, supra note 5, at 664.
13. 282 U.S. at 669.
14. 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 348-49. The Court's language is illiustrative: "ITlhe laws in
respect of riparian rights that happen to be effective for the time being in both States do not necessarily
constitute a dependable guide or just basis for the decision of controversies such as are here pre-

sented." 282 U.S. at 670.
15. 282 U.S. at 670-71.
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states, New Jersey v. New York. 6 New Jersey sought to enjoin diversion
of the Delaware River to supply water for the City of New York. The
Court ruled in favor of New York, affirming a determination of the Special
Master appointed for this case that the diversion would not materially

affect use of the Delaware River for industrial and agricultural purposes
in New Jersey. In essence, New Jersey was unable to show that it would
be injured by New York's diversions.

In reaching its decision, the Court further restricted the applicability
of the riparian rights doctrine to interstate water cases by ruling that lower
basin states could not expect upper basin states to provide undiminished
streamflows. The Court also reaffirmed the principle that diversions need
not be restricted to a specific basin. Interestingly, the Court required New
York to construct sewage treatment facilities before diversions from the
Delaware River could commence. 7
The waters of the Walla Walla River (specifically the Tum-a-lum branch)
were the subject of the next equitable apportionment decision. In Washington v. Oregon,'8 Washington sued to prevent Oregon's diversions from
the Walla Walla River and its tributaries. Both Oregon and Washington
were appropriation doctrine states. Rather than apply a strict rule of prior
appropriation, the Court ruled in favor of Oregon because existing hydrologic conditions in low-water years were such that water would not
have reached Washington had Oregon ceased its diversions. Restricting
diversions in Oregon would only have resulted in the waste of the water

resource.
Arizona sought an equitable apportionment of the Colorado River in
one of a series of cases entitled Arizona v. California.9 Arizona named
16. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). This litigation resulted from the inability of the States of New York,
New Jersey ,and Pennsylvania to resolve their conflicts regarding the waters of the Delaware River:
The interest in [Delaware River] water supply resulted in the negotiation of two
revolutionary interstate compacts. Neither was adopted, however. As a result, an
expensive two-year water fight was waged before the U.S. Supreme Court. The rules
for playing the water game in the Delaware had now been established.
ALBERT, DAMMING THE DELAWARE

25 (1987). Twenty-three years later, the decree was amended by

a process of interstate negotiations. 347 U.S. 995 (1954). The four States then involved, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, negotiated an agreement among themselves. This agreement
then became the recommendation of the Special Master and was adopted by the court. ALBERT at
44-47. See also R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 349-50; W. HutrcHINS, supra note 5, at 72; Tarlock,
supra note 5, at 396; F. TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 650.
17. New Jersey had advanced a "dilution is the solution to pollution" argument to justify its
claims to Delaware River water. An alternative, which the Court adopted, was to require New York
to construct sewage treatment facilities.
18. 297 U.S. 517 (1936). The Special Master appointed by the Court in Vermejo, in reviewing
Washington v. Oregon, made a comment which is applicable to all equitable apportionment actions:
"Unfortunately, simplicity is never the rule in cases between two States, and the current matter is
no exception." Report of Special Master on the Equitable Apportionment of the Vermejo River 15
[hereinafter Special Master]. See also Tarlock, supra note 5, at 393.
19. 298 U.S. 558 (1936). See F. TREtEASE, supra note 5, at 664.
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all of the other Colorado River Basin states as defendants.2' The suit was
dismissed, however, because the United States, an indispensable party,
had not been joined in the litigation. In fact, the United States could not
be involuntarily joined in an equitable apportionment action.2
The second case between Colorado and Kansas involving the waters
of the Arkansas River was Colorado v. Kansas.22 In this case, Colorado
sought to enjoin further lawsuits by Kansas water users against Colorado
water users. Colorado prevailed in the case because Kansas could not

demonstrate that it was being injured by water diversions in Colorado.
This burden of proof is "much greater than that generally required to be
borne by private parties." 23
Use of the water of the North Platte River was at issue in Nebraska v.
Wyoming," an equitable apportionment action involving Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado (which was impleaded) and the United States (which
intervened because of Bureau of Reclamation projects on the North Platte).
Nebraska began the action in 1934 because of fears of the possible adverse
impacts of the Kendrick Project on Nebraska water users. All three of
the states were prior appropriation doctrine states. The Court noted the
priority of existing appropriations, but did not apply strictly the prior
appropriation doctrine. While the priority of different appropriations may
be considered "the basic principle of equitable apportionment," 2 the
Court defined a number of factors to be considered in equitably apportioning interstate water resources:
20. California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
21. Certain exceptions now exist under the Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C § 620m
(1982). See F TRELEASE, supra note 5, at 665. It has been suggested that federal environmental
and wildlife protection requirements will force the United States to intervene in future equitable
apportionment actions. Tarlock, supra note 5, at 403. For example, see note 27, infra. regarding
the Endangered Species Act.
22. 320 U.S. 383 (1943). See F. TRELEASE, supra note 5. at 645.
23. 320 U.S. at 393, After this decision, Kansas and Colorado negotiated the Arkansas River
Compact which was subsequently ratified by Congress, Act of May 31, 1949, ch. 155, 63 Stat.
145, On December 16, 1985, Kansas moved for leave to file a complaint alleging that the development
of both surface and groundwater in Colorado was inconsistent with the Compact and that the
arbitration provisions of the Compact had not led to a resolution of the conflict, Kansas asked the
Court either to enforce the apportionment anticipated by the Compact or to order Colorado to comply
with the Compact's arbitration provisions. The Court allowed the filing of Kansas' complaint on
March 24, 1986. 475 U.S. 1079. In its answer and counterclaim, Colorado has contended that the
storage of water at Lake McKinney in Kansas is not beneficial use under the Compact and that
Colorado is being harmed by expanding water use in Kansas because such use violates the terms of
the Compact. The Special Master appointed by the Court on July 7, 1986, 478 U.S. 1018, subsequently died. A successor Special Master was appointed on October 19, 1987, U.S. -,
108
S.Ct. 254.
24. 325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); see 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 346;
3 W. HUTCtINS, supra note 5, at 69 n. 15, 70-71; Tarlock, supra note 5, at 399; F.TRELEASE, supra
note 5, at 654.
25. Special Master, supra note 18, at 21.
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Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use
of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate
of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of
storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former--these
are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of ap-

portionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must be
made.26

After a consideration of these factors, the Court adopted a percentage
of streamflow approach suggested by the Special Master for the case and
made a "mass allocation" to the states of Nebraska and Wyoming. The
result was "an en bloc allocation as between the two states, without an
adjudication of the rights inter sese [among water rights holders] within
each state." 27
26. 325 U.S. at 618. It has been argued that the Court, instead of attempting to make an informed
judgment based on a consideration of numerous factors, should apply the principles of the prior
appropriations doctrine which are common to those States contesting the use of a shared water
resource. See Note, Equitable Apportionment and the Supreme Court: What's So Equitable about
Apportionment?. 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 405 (1984).
27. 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 334, Existing uses inColorado were recognized and protected.
The flow of the North Platte was then divided between Wyoming and Nebraska on a percentage
basis. On October 6, 1986, Nebraska moved for leave to file a petition seeking enforcement of the
decree and injunctive relief. Nebraska contended that the decree had been violated by the construction
and operation of the Grayrocks Reservoir on the Laramie River, by the proposed construction of
the Corn Creek project at the confluence of the North Platte and Laramie Rivers, by the proposed
construction of the Deer Creek reservoir and by litigation initiated by Wyoming against the United
States concerning diversions of North Platte water for storage in Nebraska. The Court granted
Nebraska's motion on January 20, 1987, 479 U.S. 1051, and subsequently allowed Wyoming to
U.S. -,
107 S.Ct. 1883 (1987). In its counterclaim, Wyoming contended
file a counterclaim, that Nebraska was also violating the decree by demanding water in excess of present beneficial use
requirements, by diverting water for uses not recognized by the decree and by using Glendo reservoir
water outside the North Platte basin "as a substitute for storage water previously available under
U.S.
permanent arrangements." The Court appointed a Special Master on June 22, 1987, U.S. -,
107 S.Ct. 3224. Nebraska's subsequent attempt to amend its petition was denied, 108 S.Ct. 1103 (1988).
Itis interesting to note that
the Platte
River Trust and the National Audubon Society moved to
intervene in order to seek modification of the decree to require the maintenance of instream flows
on the North Platte for migratory bird (specifically, whooping crane) habitat. The motions to intervene
were referred to the Special Master. If the Court accepts the arguments of the Platte River Trust and
the National Audubon Society, then a factor which may affect future equitable apportionment actions
will be the requirements of such federal legislation as the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. I 1985); see, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F.
Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (the Endangered Species Act may
restrict the exercise of otherwise valid State water rights and the provisions of interstate stream
compacts).
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Equitable apportionment was rejected by the Court in the 1963 incarnation of Arizona v. California" primarily because Congress had provided
its own method of allocating the waters of the lower Colorado River when
the Boulder Canyon Project Act was enacted in 1928. The Court, however,
reaffirmed the equitable apportionment doctrine and held that the doctrine
would apply in the absence of congressional action.29
In Texas v. New Mexico,3" Texas asked the Court to fashion an equitable
remedy to resolve a deadlock on the Pecos River Commission. The commission, which was established under the Pecos River Compact, provided
equal representation for both states. Texas requested the Court to provide
for a tiebreaking vote. The Court refused, stating that such a fundamental
restructuring of the commission would require a change in the Pecos
River Compact, which became Federal law when it was ratified by Congress. The Court could not unilaterally change the Compact. By refusing
to case a tiebreaking vote, the Court allowed the litigation to continue.
The Special Master appointed for the case then recommended a specific
method by which New Mexico's obligations under the Compact should
be quantified. This recommendation was approved by the Court in 1984."'
Applying this method, a successor Special Master determined the amount
of water owed by New Mexico to Texas as well as a penalty for New
Mexico's failure to deliver the appropriate quantity of water. Both states
filed exceptions to this determination. The Court rejected New Mexico's
contention that the Court could only order prospective relief32 and concluded that New Mexico was obligated to compensate Texas with either
money or water. The case was returned to the Special Master for. a
determination of appropriate compensation. 3 The Court also approved
the appointment of a "River Master" to oversee implementation of its
Pecos River decree.'
Colorado v. New Mexico
Against this background, the Court was asked by Colorado to equitably
28. 373 U.S. 546.
29. This position was restated in Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983), in which the Court
explained its 1963 ruling: "We agreed with the Special Master that the allocation of Colorado River
water was to be governed by the standards set forth in the [Boulder Canyon] Project Act rather than
by the principles of equitable apportionment which in the absence of statutory directive this Court
has applied to disputed between States over entitlement to water from interstate streams." Id. at

609.
30. 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
31. 467 U.S. 1238 (1984).
U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2279, 2283 (1987).
32. 33. 107 S.Ct. at 2285.
34. 107 S.Ct. at 2287. The duties of the River Master, as recommended by the Special Master,
, 108 S.Ct. 1202. The Court has
were approved by the Court on March 28, 1988. - U.S.
retained jurisdiction over the case.
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apportion the waters of the Vermejo River, an interstate stream originating
in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in southern Colorado and flowing into
New Mexico. The Vermejo was fully appropriated by four major appropriators in New Mexico: The Vermejo Park Corporation, Kaiser Steel,
Phelps Dodge, and the Vermejo Conservancy District which was the
appropriator farthest downstream.
In 1975, Colorado issued a conditional water right to the C. F & I.
Steel Corporation for a diversion of 75 c.f.s. from the Vermejo. New
Mexico appropriators asked the United States District Court to enjoin any
diversions by C. F. & I. on the theory that, under the prior appropriation
doctrine, all New Mexico water rights had to be satisfied before any of
Colorado's could be. The District Court issued the injunction on January
16, 1978. 35 C. F. & 1. appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals,
which stayed the action pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
Colorado v. New Mexico.
The Supreme Court granted Colorado's motion for leave to file a complaint on April 16, 1979, and appointed the Hon. Ewing T. Kerr, Senior
Judge of the U.S. District Court in Wyoming, as Special Master. 16 In his
report, the Special Master recommended that Colorado be permitted to
divert 4,000 ac./ft./yr. from the Vermejo for a transmountain diversion
project. The Special Master, after reviewing the equitable apportionment
case law, rejected a strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine.
Rather, he noted that the Vermejo Conservancy District in New Mexico
was inefficient and wasted water. He concluded that New Mexico could
compensate for a 4,000 ac./ft./yr, diversion in Colorado through water
conservation measures and that any injury to New Mexico would be
"more than offset by the benefit to Colorado." 3 7
New Mexico filed exceptions to the Report of the Special Master,
arguing that the rule of priority should be strictly applied and challenging
the Special Master's conclusion that the benefits to Colorado outweighed
the harm to New Mexico. New Mexico also argued that the Special Master
based his recommendation on the belief that Colorado was entitled to a
share of Vermejo River water merely because the river originated in the
state.
The Court ruled on New Mexico's exceptions on December 13, 1982.8
If the Special Master's recommendation was based on a belief that Colorado was entitled to a share of the Vermejo because the river originated
in Colorado, this belief was rejected "as inconsistent with our emphasis
35.
36.
37.
38.

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. C. F. & 1. Steel Corp., Civ. No. 76-244 (D.N.M. 1978).
Special Master, supra note 18.
Id. at 23.
Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. 176 (1982); see also Tarlock, supra note 5, at 403.
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on flexibility in equitable apportionment." 39 The rejection by the Special
Master of a strict rule of priority was held to "comport with the doctrine
of equitable apportionment as it has evolved in our prior cases."'
Citing Kansas v. Coloradoand Connecticutv. Massachusetts, the Court
reaffirmed the doctrine of equitable apportionment as being "the doctrine
of federal common law that governs disputes between states concerning
their rights to use the water of an interstate stream."" Equitable apportionment is a flexible doctrine requiring the consideration of many factors.
The factors cataloged in Nebraska v. Wyoming were reaffirmed. While
state law may be an important consideration, the equitable apportionment
of interstate streams "is a question of federal law that depends 'upon a
consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other
relevantfacts.' "42 The Court rejected New Mexico's argument that priority of appropriation was controlling and concluded that wasteful or inefficient uses would not be protected regardless of their priority. Senior
rights neither asserted nor exercised with reasonable diligence would also
be unprotected. States, the Court said, have "an affirmative duty to take
reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate
stream." 43 The Court is clearly willing to impose these requirements on
existing uses in the states through equitable apportionment decrees. The
Court will also apply these requirements to new or proposed uses to insure
that the quantity of water needed is minimized. Protection of an existing
economy "will usually be compelling," but not always.4'
With regard to proof in an equitable apportionment action, the Court
reaffirmed the Connecticut v. Massachusettsrequirement that a state seeking an equitable apportionment decree must first show "real or substantial
injury or damage" by clear and convincing evidence. Once this is done,
the burden shifts to the state or states having existing diversions to prove,
again by clear and convincing evidence, that the diversion should be
continued.46
The Court remanded the case to the Special Master for additional factual
determinations in two areas: 1)that the use of 4,000 ac./ft./yr, in Colorado
would not materially affect New Mexico because water conservation
measures were available, and 2) that the benefit to Colorado would out39. 459 U.S. at 181 n. 8.
40. Id.at 182.
41. Id.at 183.
42. Id.at 184 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931)).
43. Id.at 185.
44. Id. at 186. It has been suggested that Vermejo I stands, in part, for the proposition that the
duty to conserve water rests with proposed, not existing, water users. Tarlock. supra note 5, at 396.
45. 459 U.S. at 187.
46. Id.at 187 n. 13. The procedural aspects of equitable apportionment actions are discussed in
R. CLARK, supra note 4,at 352.
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weigh the harm to New Mexico. The Court did not feel that it could
determine whether the doctrine of equitable apportionment had been properly applied until there was a more complete factual basis for the Special
Master's recommendations .
In Vermejo I, the Court focused on the law of equitable apportionment.
In Vermejo 1,48 the focus of the Court was on "the standard by which
we judge proof in actions for equitable apportionment." 49
Colorado's claim to any of the flow of the Vermejo River was to be
judged by a clear and convincing evidence standard. This standard is
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. It requires a showing
that a state's factual contentions are "highly probable." '5
Requiring clear and convincing evidence, the Court ruled, "is necessary
to appropriately balance the unique interests involved in water rights
disputes between sovereigns. "" In applying this standard to the evidence
in the record, the Court concluded that Colorado had failed to show that
New Mexico would compensate for water use in Colorado through reasonable conservation measures or that benefit to Colorado would outweigh
harm to New Mexico.52
A State can carry its burden of proof in an equitable apportionment
action only with specific evidence about how existing uses might be
improved, or with clear evidence that a project is far less efficient
than most other projects. Mere assertions about the relative efficiencies of competing projects will not do. s
"In short," the Court ruled, "Colorado's diversion should and will be
allowed only if actual inefficiencies in present uses or future benefits from
other uses are highly probable."

'4
'

In reaching this conclusion, the Court

reaffirmed its holding in Vermejo I that the mere fact that the river arises
in Colorado does not automatically entitle Colorado to its use.55 "[he
equitable apportionment of appropriated rights should turn on the benefits,
harms, and efficiencies of competing uses, and the source of the Vermejo

47. 459 U.S. at 182. In a concurring opinion, Justices O'Connor and Powell, citing Wyoming v.
Colorado, stressed that any water conservation measures applied to the Vermejo Conservancy District
must be "financially and physically feasible." Id. at 192.
48. Vermejo II, 467 U.S. 310 (1984); see also Tarlock, supra note 5, at 407.
49. 467 U.S. at 315.
50. Id.at 316.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 318-20. Colorado also failed to prove that it had taken steps to minimize the amount
of water to be used in Colorado. Id. at 320. This was required by Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. 176 at 186
(1982).
53. 467 U.S. at 320.
54. Id.at 317.
55. Id.at 323; 459 U.S. at 181 n.8.
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River's waters should be essentially irrelevant to the adjudication of these

sovereigns' competing claims."'
Because Colorado failed to meet its burden of proof, New Mexico's
exceptions were sustained." The case was dismissed.58
The Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment
The doctrine appears deceptively simple. States are obligated to share

interstate water resources. If a state's share of an interstate water resource
is adversely affected by the actions of another state, the state whose
interests have been injured may ask the Supreme Court to equitably
apportion the water resource. If Congress has not acted to resolve the
conflict, or if the states have been unable to resolve their differences
through an interstate compact, the Court will apportion the water resource
among those states sharing the resource."

A state seeking an equitable apportionment, however, must show that
it is actually being harmed by the actions of another state. This harm, as
stated in Connecticutv. Massachusetts, must be "real or substantial injury
or damage." ' Because of this, equitable apportionment is basically a
"downstream remedy." It would be difficult to imagine a downstream
action which would do harm or injury to an upstream state. (The upstream
state was the petitioner in Coloradov. Kansas and Colorado v. New Mexico
because of litigation in other courts brought by citizens of Kansas and
New Mexico, respectively.)
56. 467 U.S. at 323.
57. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that Colorado had, in fact, met its burden of proof and
that the findings of the Special Master should be respected by the Court. Justice Stevens was critical
of New Mexico for failing to take affirmative steps to eliminate the waste of water. In his opinion,
New Mexico was wasting water. Colorado had proven that to the Special Master by clear and
convincing evidence. The Special Master had so ruled and the Court should have affirmed the
recommendations of the Special Master. Id, at 335--(Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision in Vermejo
H was the first equitable apportionment action in which the recommendation of the Special Master
was rejected. Fahmy Note, supra note 5, at 865-66. It has been argued that this rejection will
undermine the use of Special Masters in any future equitable apportionment action. Id. at 868-69.
58. Given the benefit of perfect hindsight, one cannot help but wonder if Colorado's interests
might not have been better served had Colorado and New Mexico been able to negotiate a settlement
of the Vermejo River conflict. The resources Colorado expended on several years of litigation might
have been utilized to improve the efficiency of the Vermejo Conservancy District with Colorado
obtaining a right to that quantity of water which such improvements produced. While such an
approach might not have generated substantial legal fees, it might have resulted ultimately in Colorado
obtaining a right to use a portion of the waters of the Vermejo River. Had Colorado obtained the
right to a single acre-foot, it would have acquired more water than it obtained through its unsuccessful
equitable apportionment action.
59. The standards and principles which may apply to future equitable apportionment actions are
discussed by Tarlock, supra note 5, at 394-402, 410-11.
60. This requirement was reaffirmed in Vermejo i, 459 U.S. at 187, n.13. The Supreme Court
will not exercise its jurisdiction unless the harm is of "serious magnitude." Hinderlider v. La Plata
River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). See also 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at
68.
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As stated in Vermejo II, injury or damage must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. In essence, it must be highly probably that the facts
alleged by the complaining state are true. Once a complaining state has
met this burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defending state(s) to
prove that the diversions complained of should be allowed to continue.
This proof must also be by clear and convincing evidence.
If the complaining state and the responding state(s) meet their respective
burdens of proof, the Court will be forced to fashion a decree equitably
apportioning the shared water resource ("balancing the equities"). Because each case will focus on a specific set of facts, each decree will be
unique.
In fashioning its decree, the Court will not follow riparian water law,
nor will it be bound by a strict priority of appropriation. Prior appropriations will be a guiding principle, especially in cases involving only prior
appropriation doctrine states, but will not be the only consideration. 6 As
stated in Nebraska v. Wyoming,62 the Court will consider all relevant
factors including physical and climatic conditions, consumptive use of
water in different sections of a stream, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water,
the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas and the damages
to respective state interests if limitations on water use are imposed. Given
the Court's language in both Vermejo decisions, the extent to which the
respective states have conserved and augmented their water supplies will
also be considered.63 When fashioning its decree, the Court may require
the states to take such affirmative acts as the treatment of wastewater"
or the conservation of water.65 In essence, the Court has evolved a doctrine
of "equitable priority."
One thing, however, is clear. Once the Court has fashioned its decree,
it will generally refrain from any involvement in the administration of
61. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 331; 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at 71. Priority has been
the basis for all of the Court's decisions involving prior appropriations doctrine states except for
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936), where hydrologic conditions make its use impractical.
62. Reaffirmed in Vermejo II, 467 U.S. at 316-17.
63. In Vermejo 11, for example, the Court disagreed with the Special Master over the issue of
water conservation: -[W]e cannot agree that Colorado has met its burden of identifying, by clear
and convincing evidence, conservation efforts that would preserve any of the Vermejo River water
supply." 467 U.S. at 318; see also Tarlock, supra note 5, at 396.
64. As was done in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 346 (1931).
65. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, at 627, argued that
two additional factors should be considered: 1) the percentage of the area of a shared water resource
falling within a specific state and 2) the extent of out-of-basin diversions by a specific state. Neither
of these factors has been adopted by the Court. As argued in the Fahmy Note, supra note 5, at 857,
872, the Court should consider applying the water law concepts which are common to those states
sharing a specific water resource. This would include, for example, the burden of proof requirement
which apply in state adjudications and which, in general, are substantially less than a "clear and
convincing evidence" requirement.
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water rights under the decree in specific states.* Implementation of the
decree will be the responsibility of the states.
The Demise of a Doctrine
The requirement that a state prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it is suffering real and substantial injury or harm did not first emerge
with the Vermejo decisions. These requirements have consistently been
applied by the Court in equitable apportionment actions to determine
whether specific claims are ripe for judicial resolution; whether constitutional case and controversy requirements have been met.
What appears to have changed is the Court's conception of that quantum
of evidence that constitutes clear and convincing evidence. The evidence
offered by Colorado may have satisfied the requirements of an earlier
Court. That quantum of evidence was sufficient both for the Special
Master and for Justice Stevens. It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the quantum of evidence needed to be clear and convincing is substantially greater after the Vermejo decisions than it was before those
decisions were rendered.
Consequently, for both political and economic reasons, it is unlikely
that any state will allow an interstate water conflict to ripen to the point
where the state can show by clear and convincing evidence that it is
suffering real and substantial injury or harm.67 In the four equitable apportionment actions that are presently before the Supreme Court,6" the
initiating states will surely be forced to fulfill these requirements. Kansas
will be forced to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
Colorado has breached the Arkansas River Compact and that any such
breach has caused Kansas to suffer real and substantial injury or harm.
Nebraska will be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evi66. 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at 71.
67. A contrary interpretation of the Vermejo decisions is that the decisions have more clearly
defined the parameters of equitable apportionment and that such definition will make the doctrine a
more useful tool in resolving interstate water conflicts. See generally Tarlock, supra note 5. Time
will
tell.
68. Kansas v. Colorado, 108 S. Ct. 254 (1987); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 107 S Ct. 3224 (1987);
Texas v. New Mexico, 108 S. Ct. 1201 (1988); Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico, No. 109,
Original (U.S. filed ); see supra notes 23, 24, and 30. In the latter case, Oklahoma and Texas are
alleging that the development of conservation storage in New Mexico has violated the terms of the
Canadian River Compact, ch. 306, 66 Stat. 74 (1952). and that the conflict cannot be resolved by
the Canadian River Commission because the Compact, under which the Commission was created,
required that Commission actions be by unanimous vote. On October 5, 1987, the Supreme Court
granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a complaint. 108 S. Ct. 56. Jerome C. Muys was appointed
Special Master on January 19, 1988. 108 S. Ct. 744. New Mexico has advanced a de minimis non
curat lex defense. New Mexico's Brief in Opposition to the Oklahoma and Texas Motion for Leave
to File Complaint at 10 (filed June 25, 1987). Presumably Oklahoma and Texas will respond with
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
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dence that Wyoming's development of the North Platte River and its
tributaries is inconsistent with the Court's decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming and is causing Nebraska to suffer real and substantial injury or
harm. Challenges to the Pecos River decree by either Texas or New
Mexico will require clear and convincing evidence. Texas and Oklahoma
will be required to show that conservation storage in New Mexico is
violating the Canadian River Compact and that any such violation is
causing Texas and Oklahoma to suffer real and substantial injury or harm.
Given the Court's treatment of the evidence offered by Colorado in Vermejo, it will be interesting to see whether any of these states will be able
to fulfill their burden of proof requirements.
Absent other means to allocate interstate water resources, a downstream
state could not protect future water uses within the state from diversions
in upstream states. Only adverse impacts on existing water uses would
appear to fulfill the Supreme Court's burden of proof requirements.' This
is especially true in the eastern states where mechanisms to allocate
interstate water resources other than through equitable apportionment,
such as federal legislation or interstate stream compacts, have yet to be
developed fully.
By establishing prerequisites focusing both on clear and convincing
evidence and on real and substantial injury or harm, the Court appears
to be expressing its displeasure with its role in resolving interstate water
conflicts. Resolving such conflicts is time-consuming and demanding of
the limited resources of the Court. It is clear that the Court would prefer
these conflicts to be resolved by some other means or in some other
forum. 7' It is equally clear, however, that the original intent of the framers
of the Constitution was for the Court to resolve conflicts arising between
69. The Court, in both of the Vermejo decisions, suggested that future water uses might be
considered in certain circumstances:
The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and
immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative
and remote. Under some circumstances, however, the countervailing equities supporting a diversion for future use in one State may justify the detriment to existing
users in another State.
Vermejo I, 459 U.S. 176, 187 (1982). It is difficult, however, to imagine a circumstance where a
state could prove by clear and convincing evidence that equity favored its proposed water use over
another state's existing water use. Prior to the Vermejo decisions, the Court "had never before
considered a future use as the basis for an equitable apportionment outside the context of a compelling
need for municipal drinking water." McCrossen Note, supra note 5, at 809. Future uses of water
for industrial or agricultural purposes would not appear to be sufficient to justify an equitable
apportionment. Id.
70. It has been suggested that rigid burden of proof requirements are mandated by the inherent
conflict between claims of state sovereignty and the correlative rights of all states. Tarlock, supra
note 5, at 391. A contrary view was expressed by Justice Douglas in Nebraska v. Wyoming: "[Wihere
the claims to the water of a river exceed the supply a controversy exists appropriate for judicial
determination." 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945).
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states.7" The Court appears to be using burden of proof requirements to
escape this responsibility.
Alternative Means of Resolving Interstate Water Conflicts
In order to protect future state water uses, and because of the onerous
burden of proof requirements established in the Vermejo decisions, alternative means of resolving interstate water conflicts have become increasingly important. There are four alternatives to litigation that must
be considered. Given the inevitability of litigation, however, there are
also alternative litigation strategies that may be effective in certain circumstances.
The first alternative is the negotiation and subsequent ratification of
new interstate stream compacts. New compacts are sure to emerge, especially in the eastern states. Unfortunately, interstate compacts seldom

(if ever) satisfactorily resolve all of the issues arising in an interstate
water conflict. This lack of resolution, especially as the compacts are
implemented over time, will lead to future litigation. Texas v. New Mexico,72
Kansasv. Colorado73 and Oklahoma and Texas v.New Mexico 74 are current
examples of litigation resulting from the implementation of interstate

stream compacts.
The second alternative is federal legislation. There may be increasing
pressure for federal legislation to establish a mechanism for the allocation
of interstate water resources, to reduce the Vermejo burden of proof
requirements, or to return to the states the authority which the states lost
in the Sporhase decision." Congress clearly has the constitutional authority to enact such legislation. 76
71. While not defined as such, the original intent of the Founding Fathers is discussed in the
Fahmy Note, supra note 5, at 869-72.
72. 108 S.Ct. 1201 (1988) (involving the Pecos River Compact, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159 (1949));
see supra note 34.
73. 108 S.Ct. 254 (1987) (involving the Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949));
see supra note 23.
74. No. 109, Original (U.S. filed -) (involving the Canadian River Compact, ch. 306, 66 Stat.
74 (1952)); see supra note 68.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled
75. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
that water was an article of interstate commerce, that Nebraska's reciprocity requirement for water
exports violated Art. I, § 8 (the commerce clause) of the Constitution and that Congress had not
authorized the states to impose such otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. A
number of western states have pressed for a statutory reversal of the Sporhase decision. See, e.g.,
The Impact of Recent CourtDecisions Concerning Water and InterstateCommerce on Water Resources
of the State of New Mexico, 24 NAT. Rts. J. 689, 692, 714-15 (1984) (Report of the New Mexico
Water Law Study Committee).
76. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 364; 3 W. HuTcHINs, supra note 5, at 103; F. Trelease,
supra note 5, at 672. For example, in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Supreme
Court concluded that Congress, by enacting the Boulder Canyon Project Act, "intended to and did
create its own comprehensive scheme for the apportionment among California, Arizona, and Nevada
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The third alternative is to allow the "invisible hand of the marketplace"
to dictate the use of shared water resources. The development of "water
markets" has been receiving a great deal of attention. 77 Such markets
could be of use in allocating interstate water resources assuming that
existing institutions do not interfere with the operation of the market78
and that the values a state wishes to protect in an interstate water conflict
are amenable to quantification in economic (market) terms.79
A fourth alternative is to negotiate the resolution of interstate water
conflicts. It has been suggested that an institution similar to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service be established to assist in the negotiated resolution of such conflicts."0
Regardless of the use of alternative mechanisms to resolve interstate
water conflicts, litigation will continue. Despite the distaste it has shown

for resolving such conflicts, much of this litigation will originate in (or
end up in) the Supreme Court.
Alternative litigation strategies are emerging which, in specific circumstances, could be used as alternatives to equitable apportionment. It
is likely that additional strategies will emerge, limited only by the imagination of counsel. 8'
of the Lower Basin's share of the mainstream waters of the Colorado River, leaving each State its
tributaries." Id. at 564. This apportionment occurred through contracts executed by the Secretary
of the Interior for the waters stored in Lake Mead. 2 R. CLARK, supra note 4, at 366, concludes
that this decision illustrates three propositions: 1)that Congress can allocate the waters of interstate
streams, 2) that Congress can delegate this authority to an executive official (here the Secretary of
the Interior) and 3) that Congress did both in the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
77. See, e.g., T. ANDERSON, WATER CRIsis: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983); Williams, A
Market BasedApproach to Water Rights: Evaluating Colorado's Water System, in TRADITION, INNOVATION AND CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVES ON COLORADO WATER LAW 107 (L. MacDonnell ed. 1986).
78. For example, interstate stream compacts, once ratified by Congress, may allow a state to
impose burdens on interstate commerce that would have been otherwise impermissible following
the Sporhase decision. Rodgers, The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water Market, 21 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 357, 372-76 (1986); see also Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact
Comm'n, 590 R. Supp. 293 (D.Mont. 1983), aftd, 769 F.2d. 568 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1163 (1986) (congressional ratification shields the Yellowstone River Compact from commerce clause challenge). Absent congressional action, it is well argued that the Sporhase decision
"will spur the removal of market barriers as beneficial use evolves toward the concept of economic
efficiency." Tarlock, supra note 5, at 411.
79. The capability of the marketplace to allocate water for aesthetic, recreational and wildlife
uses has frequently been questioned. There is an inherent conflict between water markets and the
public trust, the resolution of which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
80. A modest proposal is contained in Sherk, Resolving Water Conflicts: A Potential Alternative
in Water for the 21st Century: Will It Be There? 790 (M. Collins ed. 1984).
81. For example, it has been suggested that the harshness of a strict application of the prior
appropriations doctrine could (and should) be ameliorated by a consideration of equitable apportionment principles in the context of state adjudications. Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment
of Western Water Resources. 66 NEB. L. REV. 76 (1987). While such a suggestion may cause
apoplexy in some western water lawyers, especially since it is based on California precedents, it is
a provocative proposal that deserves serious consideration.
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In August of 1985, for example, the state of South Dakota initiated
litigation in the Supreme Court against the states of Nebraska, Iowa and

Missouri. 2 In its motion for leave to file a complaint, South Dakota
argued that the Flood Control Act of 194483 constituted an appropriation
of the waters of the Missouri River among the Missouri River basin

states. South Dakota was advancing an argument similar to that accepted
by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California" regarding the Boulder
Canyon Project Act. Because of related litigation which was then pending

in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,"' South Dakota's motion for leave

to file was dismissed without prejudice.8 6
An alternative approach can be seen in North Carolina v. Hudson 7
where North Carolina sought to prevent a diversion of the waters of the
Roanoke River basin for use by Virginia Beach, Virginia. North Carolina

could have initiated this proceeding in the Supreme Court as an equitable
apportionment action. Instead, it challenged the issuance by the Corps

of Engineers of specific permits needed to construct the diversion facilities'
as being inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act, 9 the
Coastal Zone Management Act, 9' and the implementing regulations of
the Corps. North Carolina also challenged the contract executed by the

United States and Virginia Beach which allowed for water supply storage
at Kerr Reservoir on the same grounds and as violating the Water Supply
Act of 1958."'
82. South Dakota v. Nebraska, Iowa and Missouri, 103, Original (1985). It is not purely coincidental that the states named as defendants by South Dakota are the same states that initiated
successful litigation to block the proposed diversion of Lake Oahe water for use in a coal slurry
pipeline in Wyoming. In Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (D.SD..1984), the district court
ruled that the Secretary of the Interior lacked statutory authority to contract for water from a project
constructed, maintained and operated by the Corps of Engineers. This decision was affirmed by the
court of appeals, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986), and by the Supreme Court sub nom. E.T.S.I. Pilpeline
Project v. Missouri, 108 S.Ct. 805 (1988). Had the pipeline project gone forward and the proposed
diversion been allowed, South Dakota could have received revenues totalling $1.4 billion over a 50
year period. Fargo Forum, Feb. 19, 1983, at A-7. South Dakota v. Nebraska. Iowa and Missouri
is also another example of litigation being initiated in the Supreme Court by an upstream state in
response to the initiation of litigation in lower courts by downstream states. See supra text following
note 60.
83. Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
84. 373 U.S. 546 (1963); see supra notes 28, 29 and 76.
85. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (DS.D.1984).
86. 475 U.S. 1093 (1986). When the Court granted certiorari in E.T.S.I. Pipeline Project v.
Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 (1988), South Dakota moved to renew its original action. That motion
was denied without prejudice on February 29, 1988. 108 S.Ct. 1071.
87. No. 84-36-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C.) (the Lake Gaston litigation).
88. Construction of the diversion facilities required permits under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §403 (1986), and under §404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(1986),
89. 42 U.S.C §§4332 (2) (c), (2) (e) (1977).
90. 16 U.S.C. §§451-1464 (1985, Supp. 1987).
91. 43 U.S.C. &390(b) (1986, Supp. 1987).
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On July 7, 1987, the District Court ruled that the Corps had failed to
consider adequately the impacts of the proposed diversion on striped bass
spawning below Roanoke Rapids Dam and the need for mitigation if such
impacts existed. The District Court also ruled that the public interest
review process required by Corps regulations had not adequately addressed the actual need Virginia Beach had for the waters of the Roanoke
River basin. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Corps for further
proceedings. The language used by the District Court suggests that the
Corps should consider equitable apportionment principles when it conducts its public interest review: "Any diversion of water from the [Roanbe balanced against
oke River] basin is contrary to its interest and must
92
water."
the
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diversion
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for
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actual
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CONCLUSIONS
Because of the burden of proof requirements established by the Supreme Court in the Vermejo decisions, equitable apportionment actions
are no longer viable alternatives by which interstate water conflicts may
be resolved. Consequently, existing dispute resolution mechanisms such
as interstate stream compacts and federal legislation have taken on new
importance. New dispute resolution mechanisms (arbitration, mediation,
marketplace) are sure to emerge. The need to use the resources of the
courts, including the Supreme Court, to resolve water conflicts will result
in the development of new litigation strategies.
None of these alternatives would have helped the children of Israel as
they stood on the shore of the Red Sea. In the present day, however, they
may all be of substantial assistance in the management and allocation of
interstate water resources.

92. North Carolina v. Hudson, No. 84-36-CIV-5, slip op. at 39 (E.D.N.C. July 7, 1987). North
Carolina's litigation strategy may have been dictated by an inability to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that a diversion of the waters from the Roanoke River basin for use in Virginia
Beach caused North Carolina any real and substantial injury or harm. (The total proposed diversion
constituted only 1.2% of the average annual flow.) Absent such a demonstration, however, North
Carolina could not have hoped to prevail in an equitable apportionment action.

